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to be a denial of the protection of equal laws. 21 But the contention
here that the curfew order discriminated against citizens of Japanese
ancestry in violation of the Fifth Amendment was unsound, because
the distinction was based upon "facts and circumstances which are
relevant to measures for our national defense . . . and which may
in fact place citizens of one ancestry in a different category from
others. 2 3 This was the obvious logic of the Court.

DIVORCE
IS ALIMONY A VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT?
Appellant wife obtained a final decree of divorce in 1928 which
embodied a provision for payment of alimony. Respondent husband
applied to the court in June, 1938, to have the alimony provision annulled, basing his application on a statute of 1938.1 The court ordered the alimony allowance eliminated,2 and from this order an
appeal was taken. Held, reversed. The alimony allowed by a final
judgment is a vested property right. Waddey v. Waddey,
- N.Y.
--, 49 N.E. (2d) 8 (1943).
An absolute divorce and the rights incident to it are purely statutory. 3 Courts derive jurisdiction to grant divorces solely from statutes which expressly confer such jurisdiction upon them. 4
The text of the 1938 statute5 covered the relationship which existed between appellant and another man; 6 therefore, if the statute
was literally interpreted and applied retroactively to the 1928 divorce
decree, the court could have annulled the alimony provisions. However, the court followed the established rule of statutory construction
that the provisions of the statute would not be applied retrospectively
21.
22.
1.

Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1941); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271
U.S. 500 (1925); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
See instant case at 1385.

N.Y. Laws 1938, c. 161; N.Y. Civil Practice Act §1172-c, second
sentence, which states: "The court in its discretion upon application of the husband on notice, upon proof that the wife is
habitually living with another man and holding herself out as
his wife, although not married to such man, may modify such
final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by
annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders or of
both, directing payment of money for the support of such wife."
2. Waddey v. Waddey, 259 App. Div. 852, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 406
(2d Dep't 1940).
3. 1 Bl. Comm. *441; 2 Bishop, "Marriage, Divorce, and Separation" (1891) §1039.
4. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 93 N.E. 192 (1910);
Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236 (1905); Madden,
"Persons and Domestic Relations" (1931) §82.
5. See note 1 supra.
6. " . . . counsel for the defendant [respondent] was instrumental
in causing the introduction in and passage by the Legislature of
the 1938 amendment. . . . " See instant case at 10.
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unless it clearly was the intent of the legislature.7
The intent not
appearing here, the court applied the statute prospectively and not in
the retroactive sense. 8
No effect was given to a statute9 which had been on the books
since 1895 and which empowered the court to modify alimony provisions. 1" Since the final decree of divorce was given in 1928, it was
subject to the statute of 1895. The court in Fox v. Fox said, "The
effect of the statute [§ 1170] is to write a reservation into every
final judgment of divorce. The jurisdiction of the court over the
parties and over the incidental subject-matter is prolonged; and to
that extent the action may be said to be pending within the meaning
and intent of section 1169 of the Civil Practice Act."11
But the court in the case at hand maintained that " . . . the
right of appellant to alimony became a vested property right upon
the entry of the judgment and could not be affected by subsequent
legislation." 1 2 To establish this position it cited the leading case of
Livingston v. Livingston, 3 which held that alimony was a vested
property right upon decree and could not be varied by subsequent
legislation. It is to be noted, however, that at the time the Livingston
case was decided there was no statute already on the books which
gave the courts power to modify alimony provisions while there was
such a statute" at the date of this case. The court, then, had the
power to modify the alimony terms in the instant case by reason of
the existing statute, but refused to do so by resorting to the Livingston holding which, it is believed, is not in point, for although " .
a final judgment of divorce is a vested right, the judgment . . . was
granted subject to the then existing right of the court at any time
subsequent . . . to annul, vary or modify the directions as to alimony therein contained. 1"
Exercising this power, the court could
have modified the alimony directions because the divorce judgment
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Walker v. Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, 49 N.E. 663 (1898); New York
& Oswego Midland R. R. v. Van Horn, 57 N.Y. 473 (1874).
Contra: Edmunds v. Edmunds, [1926] Prob. 202.
Sutherland,
"Statutory
Construction" (1891)
§463; Sutherland, "Statutory
Construction" (Horack's ed. 1943) §§2201, 3102; Note (1935) 97
A.L.R. 1188.
Instant case at 9; cf. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E. (2d)
893 (1940).
N.Y. Laws 1895, c. 891; N.Y. Civil Practice Act §1170, second sentence, which states in effect that the court may, upon application by
either party to the action, pursuant to final judgment and after
due notice to the other party, annul, vary, or modify directions
contained therein for the support of the wife.
Instant case at 10.
263 N.Y. 68, 70, 188 N.E. 160, 161 (1933); see Judge Desmond,
dissenting in instant case at 12.
Instant case at 10.
173 N.Y. 377, 66 N.E. 123 (1903).
Contra: Eaton v. Davis, 176
Va. 330, 10 S.E. (2d) 893 (1940).
N.Y. Civil Practice Act §1170; see note 9 supra.
Waddey v. Waddey, 168 Misc. 904, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 163, 166 (Sup.
Ct. Kings Co. 1938).
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was not final; moreover, no vested rights were created in the appellant
since the decree was subject to future modification in the court's
discretion.16
Respondent sought to have future alimony payments forfeited.
-"The misconduct for which the forfeiture of alimony was . . . imposed was misconduct after the date of the statute,17 and the alimony
payments forfeited were those which were to come due in the future.
In no real sense can such a use of the statute be considered to be
retrospective."18
The court had power to modify the alimony provisions; 19 the action was pending;20 the legislature had determined grounds for the
court's acting; 2 1 appellant was included under the legislative determination;22 therefore, it is submitted that it was within the court's
discretion to have considered the annulment of alimony under the
divorce decree of 1928 as to those payments which were to come due
2
after the 1938 statute2 3 became effective. 4

MILITARY SERVICE
REGISTRANT'S DUTY TO INFORM SELECTIVE SERVICE
BOARD OF HIS MAILING ADDRESS
Petitioner, a Houston, Texas, registrant under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,1 was classified 1-A by his local board,
which advised him that he would be inducted in twenty or thirty days.
With this knowledge, petitioner became a merchant seaman for a
short trip to New York City, leaving word with the National Maritime Union's Houston office to forward his mail to its New York
office. The local board was also advised of the registrant's shipping,
and was requested to send his induction notice to the union's Houston
office. This notice was mailed and forwarded to the New York City Office, but petitioner, who had meanwhile signed on for a foreign voyage from New York City, never received the notice although he was
in New York harbor and had received assurances from the union's
executive officer that he would be contacted when the notice arrived.
Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court for a knowing
failure to keep his draft board advised of the address where mail
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
1.

See Judge Desmond, dissenting in the instant case at 12; also
see note 9 supra.
March 26, 1938.
See Judge Desmond, dissenting in the instant case at 12, 13.
See note 14 supra.
Fox v. Fox, 263 N.Y. 68, 70, 188 N.E. 160, 161 (1933).
N.Y. Civil Practice Act §1172-c; see note 1 supra.
See notes 1 and 6 supra.
See note 21 supra.
See note 17 supra.
54 Stat. 885 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §301 et seq. (Supp. 1943).

